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UNITED STATES v. ANDERSON-THE PLEA BARGAIN AS
AN AGREEMENT TO BECOME AND TO REMAIN
CONVICTED
In a criminal prosecution the defendant who enters into a typical
plea bargain' escapes prosecution on a more serious offense by pleading
guilty to a lesser charge.2 In entering a guilty plea, the defendant waives
a number of constitutional rights,' but nevertheless may attack the re-
1. Recent decisions of the Supreme Court have affirmed the validity of plea bargains
as an effective tool in the administration of justice. See Santobello v. New York, 404
U.S. 257 (1971); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970); McMann v. Richardson,
397 U.S. 759 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). In these cases, "the
Court went out of its way . . .to validate a number of aspects of present-day plea bar-
gaining, approving the practice of granting lighter sentences or reducing charges in
exchange for pleas of guilty, and putting its imprimatur upon the litany of the plea
as it is performed in almost every court in the land." Tigar, The Suprene Court 1969
Te-nn, Forward: TVaiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HARV. L.
Rirv. 1, 4 (1970). Courts and commentators often have noted the value of plea bar-
gaining with respect to the conservation of judicial and prosecutorial resources. See, e.g.,
Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 31 (1973); Santobello v. New York, supra at
260-61; Brady v. United States, supra at 752; United States ex rel Williams v. McMann,
436 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1970). See also Note, The Suprente Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARv. L.
REv. 30, 150 (1970).
Some commentators, however, continue to criticize the actual process of plea bar-
gaining and question the constitutionality of the technique. See, e.g., White, A Pro-
posal for Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 439 (1971); Tigar,
supra at 4-25; Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REv.
50 (1968); Chalker, Judicial Myopia, Differential Sentencing and the Guilty Plea-A
Constitutional Examination, 6 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 187 (1968); Newman, Pleading Guilty for
Considerations: A Study of Bargain Justice, 46 J. CRUM. L.C. & P.S. 780 (1956); Note,
Restructuring the Plea Bargain, 82 YALE L.J. 286 (1972). See also Tentative Standards
Relating to Pleas of Guilty, ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE
(1967).
2. The charges usually arise from the same transaction, and the lesser offense fre-
quently is included in the greater. See generally Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S.
257, 260-63 (1971).
3. A guilty plea "constitutes a waiver of the fundamental rights to a jury trial, Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, to confront one's accusers, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,
to present witnesses in one's defense, lVashington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, to remain
silent, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, and to be convicted by proof beyond all reasonable
doubt, In re lVinship, 397 U.S. 358." Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 264 (1971)
(Douglas, J., concurring). The defendant does not waive, however, his right to counsel.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (guilty plea to felony charge entered without
counsel and without a specific waiver is involuntary).
The Supreme Court has recognized that though it acts as a practical restraint on the
exercise of the right to a trial by jury, a plea bargain induced by the possibility of a
more serious sentence following a jury trial nonetheless may be valid. North Carolina
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suiting conviction. 4 If the conviction is set aside following defendant's
appeal or collateral attack, the accused may be retried for the same of-
fense.' This Comment focuses on the related question of whether the
defendant may be brought to trial on the more serious charge originally
contemplated but abandoned in favor of the plea bargain and consequent
conviction.
Two inquiries lead to a proper disposition of this question. The first
inquiry is whether under the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amend-
ment,' the state, in prosecuting the lesser charge, relinquishes its right to
prosecute the greater offense at a later time. If relinquishment is not
found, the second inquiry is whether the facts of the case offer the
likelihood that prosecutorial vindictiveness toward the defendant for
having attacked successfully his first conviction may motivate the sub-
sequent prosecution on the greater charge. If such a likelihood of vindic-
tiveness exists, and the defendant is convicted of the greater offense, due
process of law demands a reversal. 7
In the federal system, judicial application of this dual-inquiry test has
not yielded uniform results; although it appears that the due process in-
quiry presents an evidentiary problem that can be disposed of by the
peculiar facts of each case, a conflict in the courts of appeals has emerged
as to what constitutes "relinquishment" under the double jeopardy in-
v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970); Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). More broadly, this trilogy holds that when a
guilty plea is entered, a defendant is barred from later challenging the pretrial pro-
ceeding on constitutional grounds, though he may attack the voluntariness of the
plea. Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 95 S. Cr. 886, 889 (1975); Tollett v. Henderson, 411
U.S. 258, 261-69 (1973). A state, however, may provide by statute that the right of
constitutional attack is preserved despite a guilty plea. Lefkowitz v. Newsome, supra
at 890-91.
4. The right of appeal is statutory, not constitutional. See Blackledge v. Perry, 94
S. Ct. 2098, 2101 n.4 (1974). See also Comment, Plea Bargaining Mishaps-The Possi-
bility of Collaterally Attacking the Resultant Plea of Guilty, 65 J. CRIM. L. & C. 170
(1974).
5. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 720-21 (1969); United States v. Ball, 163
U.S. 662 (1896); Miller v. United States, 224 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1955). See Note,
Double Jeopardy: The Reprosecution Problem, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1272, 1283 (1964). See
note 20 infra. On retrial, however, there are limitations on the sentence that a recon-
victed defendant may receive. See North Carolina v. Pearce, supra, discussed at notes
30-36 infra & accompanying text.
6. "[NIor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb . . . ." U.S. Co-,sT. amend. V.
7. The fifth amendment guarantees due process of law, when a person is threatened




quiry. In United States v. Anderson,8 the Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit recently held that when the government, federal or state,
reduces a charge in return for a negotiated plea of guilty, it does not
relinquish absolutely the right to prosecute the defendant for the greater
charge. Under Anderson, a defendant therefore is not placed in double
jeopardy when, following the vacation of a guilty plea to a lesser of-
fense, the government prosecutes the greater offense. Anderson reaffirms
the position taken by other circuits in rejecting the rationale of Mull-
reed v. Kropp9 in which the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held
that "there is implicit in a court's acceptance of a plea to an included
lesser offense a determination that the right to prosecute the defendant
on the more serious offense with which he is charged has been relin-
quished." 'o Examination of this conflict in particular, and the dual-
inquiry test in general, must begin with a review of the relevant deci-
sions of the Supreme Court.
THE DUAL-INQUIRY TEST AS FORMULATED
BY THE SUPREME COURT
Double Jeopardy
Protection against double jeopardy," "an indispensable requirement of
a civilized criminal procedure," 12 is embodied in the fifth amendment
to the United States Constitution,13 and has been held, under the incor-
poration doctrine, to be enforceable against the states through the four-
teenth amendment.14 Both the language and history of the double
8. 514 F.2d 583 (7th Cir. 1975).
9. 425 F.2d 1095 (6th Cir. 1970). See text accompanying notes 49-59 infra.
10. Rivers v. Lucas, 477 F.2d 199, 202 (6th Cir. 1973), interpreting and aff'g 425 F.2d
1095 (6th Cir. 1970).
11. In a jury trial, jeopardy attaches when the jury is impaneled and sworn. Serfass
v. United States, 95 S. Ct. 1055, 1062 (1975); Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734
(1963). In a nonjury trial jeopardy attaches when the court begins to hear evidence.
Serfass v. United States, supra at 1062; Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 688 (1949).
When a trial is terminated prematurely before verdict is rendered, retrial is permissible
only if the termination was with the consent of the defendant or as a result of manifest
necessity. Id. at 688-89. This rule permits retrial when the jury is unable to reach a
verdict. Since the necessity must be real and manifest, however, the accused escapes
further prosecution if the judge declares a mistrial and dismisses the jury without
justification. See, e.g., United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 486-87 (1971). As to when
jeopardy attaches, see J. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEoPARDY 39-47 (1969).
12. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 200 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
13. See note 6 supra.
14. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969), overruling Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319 (1937); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 US. 145, 149 (1968) (fourteenth amend-
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jeopardy clause are laden with ambiguity,'5 thereby hindering a well-
defined delineation of its scope. As noted by the Supreme Court, how-
ever, the double jeopardy principle is directed toward avoiding
certain evils created by repeated governmental prosecutions for an al-
leged offense, specifically, harassment of the individual and the resultant
probability that, through repeated, prosecution, an innocent defendant
may be found guilty.1 6
The double jeopardy clause has been held to bar a second prosecution
for the same offense after acquittal, 17 or after conviction,' S and to pro-
hibit multiple punishments for the same offense.' 9 It does not, however,
bar retrial of a defendant on the same charge when the original convic-
tion is overturned on appeal or by collateral attack at the instance of the
accused.2
0
ment guarantees a jury trial in state criminal prosecutions to which, if the trial were
held in federal court, the sixth amendment would apply).
15. See Sigler, A History of Double Jeopardy, 7 AM. J. LEGAL HiSt. 283, 303-07 (1963);
Note, Double Jeopardy: A Problem Under Dual Sovereignty, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 521,
526-27 (1958). See also Breed v. Jones, 95 S. Ct. 1779, 1788 (1975); Green v. United
States, 355 U.S. 184, 201-02 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
16. The most complete statement of the Court appears in Green v. United States:
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-
American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources
and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an
individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment,
expense, and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of
anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though
innocent he may be found guilty.
355 US. at 187-88. For a thorough analysis of the philosophical background and judi-
cial treatment of the double jeopardy prohibition, see Justice Frankfurter's dissent to
Green at 198-219. See SIGLER, supra note 11 at 1-76.
17. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796 (1969); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 US.
711, 717 (1969); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957); United States v. Ball,
163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896). See also SIGLER, supra note 15 at 39.
18. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969); In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176,
190 (1889).
19. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 169 (1873). At resentencing, when
allowed, the defendant must be given credit for time served on the original sentence.
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 718 (1969). See generally Note, Twice in
Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 263-66 (1965).
20. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896). Retrial for the same offense has been
justified on the grounds that an accused waives his double jeopardy defense in seeking
reversal of an initial conviction, and on the theory of continuing jeopardy, that is,
that the jeopardy of the first trial continues until final disposition of the case. See
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 811-12 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Green v.
United States, 355 U.S. 184, 189 (1957); Ward v. Page, 424 F.2d 491, 493 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 917 (1970).
Both the waiver and the continuing jeopardy theories also have been applied to justify
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In two principal cases the Supreme Court has considered the prob-
lem of applying the double jeopardy principle in cases involving multi-
ple offenses arising from the same transaction. In the first, Green v.
United States,2 the defendant was charged with both arson and first
degree murder. At trial, the jury was given instructions on these of-
fenses, as well as on second degree murder which, in the District of
Columbia where the case arose, was a lesser offense included in the of-
fense of first degree murder. The jury found the defendant guilty of ar-
son and second degree murder, but remained silent as to the first degree
murder charge. On appeal, the second degree murder charge was re-
versed as unsupported by the evidence. The defendant was retried next
for first degree murder and convicted. The Supreme Court held that re-
trial on the greater charge placed the defendant in double jeopardy. The
silence of the original jury on the first degree murder charge was held
to constitute an "implicit acquittal" of that offense, the effect of which
was the same as a verdict expressly stated. 2 Green, once having been
placed in peril of conviction for first degree murder, could not be forced
to stand in jeopardy again. Jeopardy attached to the defendant on this
charge when the jury in the original suit was empanelled and sworn.
The Court refused to accept the contention that in appealing the con-
retrial following acquittal and appeal by the state. Construction of the double jeopardy
clause relative to appeals by the Government is set forth in United States v. Wilson, 95
S. Ct. 1013, 1022-23 (1975).
21. 355 U.S. 184 (1957). See Note, Double Jeopardy: Defense in Retrial for Greater
Offense Upon Reversal of Conviction of Lesser Offense, 1957 DUKE L.J. 37; Note,
Defendant's Waiver of Double Jeopardy by Appealing Conviction for a Lesser Included
Offense, 66 YALE LJ. 592 (1957) (discussion of decision of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, 236 F.2d 708 (D.C. Cit. 1956), reversed by the Supreme Court
decision cited above); 9 SYRACUSE L. REV. 331 (1958).
22. 355 U.S. at 190. See Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 (1970), citing Green at 327-30.,
Significantly, the Court's analysis treated the two offenses, first and second degree
murder, as separate and distinct with respect to the application of double jeopardy
protection. See 355 U.S. at 190-91. Determining when distinct statutory offenses should
be construed as a unity has been a persistent problem in the interpretation and applica-
tion of the double jeopardy prohibition. For uniformity, many jurisdictions employ an
actual evidence test, by which prosecution of a second and purported separate offense
is barred if the evidence introduced to prove a first offense to which jeopardy has
attached also would prove the second. An exception usually is made, in applying this
test, for related offenses of which the lesser is included in the greater, with the
result that in most jurisdictions offenses s'o related are considered identical for double
jeopardy purposes. This exception protects the defendant who is convicted of either
of the two related offenses but would subject this same defendant to renewed prosecu-
tion for both offenses if his conviction were set aside. See Kirchheimer, The Act, The
Offense and Double jeopardy, 58 YALE L.J. 513 (1949); Note, Twvice in Jeopardy, 75
YALE LJ. 262 (1965).
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viction of second degree murder, the defendant had waived his constitu-
tional defense of former jeopardy.a
The Court reaffirmed the Green doctrine in a second case, Benton v.
Maryland,24 in which the defendant had been convicted of burglary and
acquitted of larceny by a jury. Before disposition of the defendant's ap-
peal from this verdict, however, the Maryland Court of Appeals had
held unconstitutional the process utilized by the state to select juries;
as a result, the state gave the defendant the option of demanding reindict-
ment and retrial, rather than further pursuing his appeal. Seizing this
option, the defendant moved to dismiss the larceny charge on double
jeopardy grounds; the trial judge, however, was not persuaded, and ap-
parently distinguished Green by accepting the state's argument that the
original indictment in Benton was void and therefore could not have
placed the defendant in jeopardy of any offense.25 Citing well-estab-
lished precedent, 2 the Supreme Court disagreed, noting that since the
trial court had exercised jurisdiction over the defendant, the defective
jury selection process made the judgment voidable, not void. Accord-
ingly, the Court refused to permit the state to allege its own failure to
deny that the defendant previously had been placed in danger of con-
viction, and consequently the court reversed the conviction for lar-
ceny.2 7
Due Process,
Although focusing primarily on the double jeopardy relinquishment
inquiry, and holding that the state relinquishes the right to prosecute a
defendant for an offense implicitly found by a jury not to have been
23. 355 U.S. at 191.
24. 395 U.S. 784 (1969), overruling Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). See
Note, Limits of the Concurrent Sentence Doctrine as a Jurisdictional Bar-The Fifth
Amiendmnent's Double Jeopardy Protection Applied to the States, 65 Nw. U.L. REv. 123
(1970); Comment, The Retroactivity of Benton v. Maryland, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 517;
11 WM. & MARY L. REv. 564 (1969).
25. 395 U.S. at 796-97.
26. The Court noted that United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896), answered in the
negative the state's argument that a void indictment creates no jeopardy. In Ball, three
co-defendants were tried and two were convicted on an indictment found on appeal to
contain insufficient allegations. On the retrial of all three, the defendant originally
acquitted was convicted. His appeal on double jeopardy grounds was upheld. The
Court held that the technical invalidity in the indictment was the fault of the gov-
ernment and therefore could not be used to override the defendant's jury acquittal.
The Court in Benton noted that in both Ball and Benton, the indictments were not
void, but voidable at defendant's option.
27. 395 U.S. at 796-97.
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committed, Green also suggests that due process considerations are close-
ly related to the double jeopardy inquiry: "Conditioning an appeal of
one offense on a coerced surrender of a valid plea of former jeopardy on
another offense exacts a forfeiture in plain conflict with the constitutional
bar against Double Jeopardy." 28 Although couched in double jeopardy
terms, this language invokes the "chilling effect" notion that the de-
fendant's right to attack his conviction would be impaired if a successful
appeal would subject him to the threat of a subsequent, arbitrary prose-
cution on a more serious charge.29
This line of inquiry was crystallized by the Supreme Court in North
Carolina v. Pearce.3 ° There the defendant had been convicted and sen-
tenced for assault to commit rape; several years later, the conviction was
set aside, and subsequently the defendant was retried, convicted, and
given a new sentence. Because the second sentence, together with the
time already served, exceeded his original sentence, the defendant sought
relief in the federal courts, alleging denial of his constitutional rights.
Confronted with arguments based on both the double jeopardy and
due process clauses, the Court refused to apply the double jeopardy
principle, which would have imposed an absolute limit on sentences fol-
lowing retrial, 31 and chose instead to implement3 2 a more flexible remedy
under due process by holding that a more severe sentence following re-
28. 355 US. at 193-94.
29. The Court noted: "Reduced to plain terms, the Government contends that in
order to secure the reversal of an erroneous conviction of one offense, a defendant
must surrender his valid defense of former jeopardy not only on that offense but also
on a different offense for which he was not convicted and which was not involved in
his appeal.... The law should not, and in our judgment does not, place the defendant
in such an incredible dilemma." 355 US. at 193.
Elsewhere the Court has stated: "It can hardly be doubted that it would be a flagrant
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment for a state trial court to [impose] a heavier
sentence upon every reconvicted defendant for the explicit purpose of punishing the
defendant for his having succeeded in getting his original conviction set aside." North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723-24 (1969). See Borman, The Chilled Right to
Appeal from a Plea Bargain Conviction: A Due Process Cure, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 663
(1974).
30. 395 U.S. 711 (1969). See Aplin, Sentence Increases on Retrial After North Caro-
lina v. Pearce, 39 U. CIN. L. REv. 427 (1970); Note, In Van Alstyne's Wake: North
Carolina v. Pearce, 31 U. Pirr. L. REv. 101 (1969); 55 A.B.AJ. 1077 (1969).
31. 395 U.S. at 718-19. Although the Court held that "neither the double jeopardy
provision nor the Equal Protection Clause imposes an absolute bar to a more severe
sentence upon reconviction," id. at 723, it also held that the guaranty against double
jeopardy "absolutely requires that punishment already exacted must be fully 'credited'
in imposing sentence upon a new conviction for the same offense." Id. at 718-19 (foot-
note omitted).
32. 395 U.S. at 723.
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trial could be imposed only when it could be justified by "objective in-
formation concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant
occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding." Invok-
ing the "chilling effect" doctrine,3 4 the Court stated that:
Due process of law, then, requires that vindictiveness against a
defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must
play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial. And since
the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a de-
fendant's exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his
first conviction, due process also requires that a defendant be freed
of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the
sentencing judge.35
This principle both protects the right of defendants to pursue appeal
without fear of retaliation, and preserves the state's interest in sentencing
convicted defendants in accordance with modern concepts of penology. 6
In Blackledge v. Perry, 7 the due process vindictiveness inquiry was
applied to examine the actions of prosecutors. In Perry the defendant,
charged with the misdemeanor of assault with a deadly weapon, was
tried and convicted by a judge having jurisdiction only of the trial
of misdemeanors. When the defendant exercised a statutory right to
trial de novo in a higher court, he was indicted for felony assault on the
basis of the same conduct that had led to the misdemeanor charge. The
Supreme Court held that the state violated the due process clause of the
United States Constitution by pursuing a more serious charge against
the defendant in response to his invocation of the statutory right to trial
de novo. 38
Following the rationale of Pearce, the Court in Perry stated that
"[a] person convicted of an offense is entitled to pursue [appeal], with-
33. Id. at 726. See note 29 supra. The Court also stated that "the factual data upon
which the increased sentence is based must be made part of the record, so that the
constitutional legitimacy of the increased sentence may be fully reviewed on appeal." Id.
34. See note 29 supra & accompanying text.
35. 395 U.S. at 725 (footnote omitted).
36. Id. at 723. The majority in Pearce also disposed of Simpson v. Rice in the same
opinion. Since the facts there suggested a plea bargain in the original proceedings, at
least one judge has inferred that application of the Pearce doctrine is not limited by
the presence of a negotiated plea. United States ex. rel. Williams v. McMann, 436 F.2d
103, 107 (2d Cir. 1970) (Hays, J., concurring), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 914 (1971) (dis-
cussed at notes 74-79 infra & accompanying text).
37. 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974).
38. Id. at 2103.
[Vol. 17:383
PLEA BARGAIN
out apprehension that the State will retaliate by substituting a more
serious charge for the original one, thus subjecting him to a significantly
increased potential period of incarceration." '9 The Court emphasized,
however, that Pearce and its progeny 40 do not stand for the principle
that the due process clause is offended "by all possibilities of increased
punishment upon retrial after appeal, but only by those that pose a realis-
' "41tic likelihood of 'vindictiveness'.
The Court's refusal in Perry to pursue a double jeopardy relinquish-
ment inquiry is as significant as its further delineation of the due process
vindictiveness inquiry. In Perry, the state by its initial refusal to prose-
cute the greater charge, arguably had placed the defendant in the same
position as if he previously had been acquitted of the greater charge.
Application of the Green holding to the facts in Perry would equate
the "implicit acquittal" by a jury 42 to the decision of the state not to
prosecute the felony charge initially, and would bar its subsequent
prosecution following appeal from a conviction on the misdemeanor
charge. Refusal so to extend the first step of the dual-inquiry test
impliedly restricts expansion of the test. As noted previously, however,
the courts of appeals have disagreed on this point.
THE DUAL-INQUIRY TEST AS
FORMULATED BY THE FEDERAL COURTS
OF APPEALS
Double Jeopardy: The Relinquishment Inquiry
Simply stated, Green and Benton demand that a defendant acquitted
by a jury of one offense and convicted of a lesser included offense
not be retried on the greater offense after a successful appeal. The gov-
ernment relinquishes its right to prosecute in the future any offense of-
fered to the jury for disposition. In Ward v. Page43 an appellate court
39. Id. at 2102-03.
40. Perry discussed two cases that limited the rationale of Pearce to the specific
purpose of avoiding vindictiveness toward a defendant. In Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S.
104 (1972), and Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973), the Court examined re-
sentencing by a separate court or jury and deemed Pearce outside the scope of inquiry
because the danger of vindictiveness was believed de minimus. In contrast, in Perry
the Court, recognizing that "[a] prosecutor clearly has a considerable stake in dis-
couraging [defendants] from appealing," found the rule of Pearce applicable. 94 S. Cr.
at 2102.
41. 94 S. Ct. at 2102.
42. See notes 21-22 supra & accompanying text.
43. 424 F.2d 491 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 917 (1970). Ward concerned
19751
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
first considered the issue of whether the government likewise relinquishes
its right to prosecute in the future a greater offense when it permits the
defendant to plead guilty to a lesser included offense that subsequently
is appealed successfully; under these circumstances the Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit held that there was no relinquishment. 44 Finding
"no authority, which suggests that a guilty plea to a lesser offense op-
erates as an acquittal on all greater offenses," 45 the court stated that the
defendant was outside the ambit of Benton46 and denied relief on the
grounds that he had not been acquitted of the charge he sought to
avoid.4T Although conceding that the defendant's guilty plea was as final
as a jury verdict, the court refused to take the further step, urged by
the petitioner, of equating the double jeopardy implications of a guilty
plea with those of a jury verdict.4 8
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, unpersuaded by the logic
of Ward, found to the contrary in Mullreed v. Kropp,49 a case that
has not been followed by any other court of appeals. In Mullreed, the
defendant, initially charged with armed robbery, entered a plea of guilty
a defendant indicted for first-degree murder who pleaded guilty to the lesser included
offense of first-degree manslaughter following two days of trial by jury. Subsequent to
federal habeas corpus proceedings in which the guilty plea was held to be involuntary,
Ward v. Page, 336 F.2d 602 (10th Cir. 1964), the defendant was retried on the original
charge. Followipg a jury verdict of guilty of first degree murder and a sentence of
life imprisonment, the defendant appealed, contending that the retrial constituted a
second incident of jeopardy on the first degree murder charge. In reviewing the facts
of the case, it should be remembered that jeopardy attaches in a jury trial when the
jury is impaneled and sworn. See note 11 supra.
44. 424 F.2d at 493.
45. Id.
46. 395 U.S. 784 (1969). See notes 24-27 supra & accompanying text. See also Booker
v. Phillips, 418 F.2d 424 (10th Cir. 1969) (cited by the Ward court as consistent with
Benton but distinguishable from Ward).
47. 424 F.2d at 493. Ward eventually obtained relief in the state courts where the
government was held estopped from reinstituting the greater charge, having previously
elected to pursue only the lesser. Ward v. State, 444 P.2d 255 (Okla. Crim. App.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1040 (1968).
48. 424 F.2d at 493. In Ward, the accused did not plead guilty until his trial on the
first degree murder charge and on the lesser, included manslaughter charge had begun.
Therefore, he was placed in jeopardy on both charges. Because the trial was
terminated prematurely, without a jury verdict, retrial was permissible only if the first
trial had been terminated with the consent of the defendant or because of manifest
necessity. See vote 11 supra. This aspect of the double jeopardy protection is not
addressed in Ward and apparently was not made an issue in the case.
49. 425 F.2d 1095 (6th Cir. 1970). For a discussion of issues raised by Mullreed and
Ward, see Comment, The Constitutionality of Reindicting Successful Plea-Bargain Ap-
pellants on the Original Higher Charges, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 258 (1974).
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to unarmed robbery, pursuant to a plea bargain. Sentenced to prison, he
was released following a showing in habeas corpus proceedings that his
request for counsel had been denied. Immediately rearrested, he was con-
victed in a jury trial of the original armed robbery charge. Relying upon
Green50 and Benton,5' the court in Mullreed held that the defendant's
trial on the armed robbery charge violated the double jeopardy clause of
the fifth amendment. 52 Noting "a deliberate decision on the part of the
State not to prosecute on the charge of armed robbery", the court stated
that such a refusal amounted to a "relinquishment of its rights" to do
so. 53 Mullreed clearly is an extension of the double jeopardy relinquish-
ment inquiry as defined by the Supreme Court, for the defendant had
neither pleaded guilty, nor been tried nor even been indicted on the
greater charge during the first proceeding. In the initial pretrial pro-
ceeding, he could not have been found guilty of charges other than
those to which he was willing to plead guilty. Therefore, whereas the
action by the state in Green was deemed by the Court to be "contrary
to both the letter and the spirit of the Fifth Amendment," " the com-
parable action in Mulreed appears to be contrary to the spirit but not
the letter of the double jeopardy provision.
Supreme Court decisions subsequent to Mullreed indicate that this ex-
tension of the definition of relinquishment under the double jeopardy
inquiry has not been well-received. The Court's disposition of Perry on
due process grounds argues against an inclination to extend the rule of
Green.55 Moreover, recent Supreme Court cases conclusively affirm the
traditional definition of jeopardy as risk of conviction. In Serfass v.
United States,56 the Court held that criminal proceedings subsequent
50. See notes 21-23 supra & accompanying text.
51. 425 F.2d at 1101-02.
52. Id. at 1102.
53. Id. at 1099. On the basis of the Michigan criminal statutes under which Mullreed
was tried, the court concluded that it was "apparent that the conviction on the lesser
offense requires an affirmative finding that the [defendant] was not armed...." Id. at
1102. The case, however, is not delimited by this conclusion. See Rivers v. Lucas,
477 F.2d 199, 202 (6th Cir.), vacated as moot, 414 U.S. 896 (1973).
54. 355 U.S. at 198.
55. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
56. 95 S. Ct. 1055 (1975). Serfass concerned a criminal prosecution for wilful failure
to report for induction into the armed forces. At a pre-trial hearing, the district
court dismissed the indictment. The Government, pursuant to a specific statutory grant
of the right to appeal in cases in which jeopardy had not attached, secured a reversal
in the court of appeals. On'certiorari, the defendant argued that in fact he had been
in "constructive jeopardy" in the district court, where "the disposition of his motion
to dismiss the indictment was, in the circumstances of [the] case, the 'functional equiva-
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to the dismissal of an indictment at a pretrial hearing would not violate
the double jeopardy prohibition because the defendant could not have
been convicted at the hearing, and therefore, was not placed in jeopar-
dy.57 And in United States v. Jenkins,58 the Court held the double jeop-
ardy bar applicable when "[t]he trial, which could have resulted in a
judgment of conviction, had long since terminated in respondent's
favor." 11
The recent case of United States v. Anderson ° comports with this
line of Supreme Court decisions. There, the defendant, initially charged
with armed bank robbery,6' was sentenced to ten years imprisonment
after pleading guilty, pursuant to an agreement with the prosecutor, to
the lesser offense of unarmed bank robbery.62 On review, the appellate
court noted that the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum and or-
dered the Government to file a memorandum addressing this illegality.
At the suggestion of the government, the plea then was vacated; the de-
fendant was reindicted and subsequently convicted by a jury of the
original offense of armed bank robbery. The defendant again received
a ten year sentence; this time, however, the term fell within statutory
limits. The defendant appealed, alleging both double jeopardy and due
process violations.
In examining the double jeopardy claim, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit found no violation of the fifth amendment. Rejecting
lent of an acquittal on the merits .. d.' I . at 1063. The Court rejected this argument
by noting that jeopardy consistently has been defined as attaching when the defendant
is put to trial before the trier of facts. Id. at 1062. This Comment suggests a qualifica-
tion to this definition at notes 65-69 infra & accompanying text.
57. "Both the history of the Double Jeopardy Clause and its terms demonstrate that
it does not come into play until a proceeding begins before a trier 'having :urisdiction
to try the question of the guilt or innocence of the accused.'" Id. at 1064, quaoting
Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 133 (1904). Because the defendant in Serfass
had not waived his right to a jury trial, the district court, when it dismissed the indict-
ment against him, was without jurisdiction to decide questions of guilt or innocence,
and jeopardy, therefore, could not attach. Although the decision did not turn specifi-
cally on the issue of jury trial, if defendant had waived that right, a dismissal of an
indictment, arguably, would have operated as an acquittal.
58. 95 S. Ct. 1006 (1975). Jenkins, like Serfass, notes 56 & 57 supra, involved prosecu-
tion for failure to submit to induction. After the district court had dismissed the in-
dictment in the course of the trial, the Government sought to appeal, contending that
dismissal of an indictment was not an acquittal. The Court held that since further pro-
ceedings to resolve factual issues would be required if the dismissal of the indictment
were reversed, the double jeopardy bar applied.
59. Id. at 1013 (emphasis supplied).
60. 514 F.2d 583 (7th Cir. 1975).
61. Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (d) (1970).
62. Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (b) (1970).
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the Mulireed rationale that the Government, in initially refusing to prose-
cute the more serious offense, had relinquished absolutely its right to do
so, the court condluded that the Government had only "conditionally
relinquished this right provided Anderson was convicted of and re-
mained convicted of the [lesser offense]." " In so holding, Anderson dis-
tinguished Green by stating that in Green the "implicit acquittal on the
greater charge was in no sense contingent on the continued viability of
the conviction for the lesser offense." 64 Initially, this distinction appears
to be worranted, for in Green, the defendant was deemed to have been
in prior jeopardy for the greater offense because the prosecution had
forced the defendant to face the danger of conviction for that offense
by actually having a jury consider his guilt with regard to it, whereas in
Anderson the state chose not to subject the defendant to the danger of
conviction by a jury on the greater offense. This difference would seem
to support the argument that Anderson had never been in jeopardy for
the greater offense; Green had been implicitly acquitted, but Anderson
had not. Upon closer consideration, however, the distinction is less clear-
ly warranted, for it may be argued that Anderson, too, was essentially
"acquitted."
Implicit in the prosecution's decision not to take the defendant to
trial on the greater offense is a consideration of the likelihood of ob-
taining a conviction on that charge, which, in turn, entails a considera-
tion of the guilt of the defendant. When the prosecution decided not
to go to trial on the greater charge, and when this decision was allowed
by the trial judge for the lesser offense, the prosecution and judge, in
effect, "acquitted" the defendant, because following the conviction on
the lesser offense the state was barred from prosecuting the greater of-
fense. '5 Thus, immediately following his conviction, Anderson's status.
63. 514 F.2d at 587.
64. Id.
65. Cf. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 191 (1957). Prosecution of the greater
offense while the conviction of the lesser remained in effect clearly was barred by the
plea bargain in Anderson.
In the more general factual situation of conviction of a lesser offense subsequent to a
guilty plea but absent a plea bargain, prosecution for a greater, related offense arising
from the same criminal episode uniformly has been held to be barred when the greater
offense is similar to the lesser and, in some manner, an aggravated form of the lesser.
Ultimately, this bar to further prosecution is based on legislative intent that the accused
not be convicted of both offenses. This objective frequently is achieved in practice
by considering the offenses as identical for double jeopardy purposes. This approach
is advantageous to the defendant while he stands convicted of the lesser offense, but
disadvantageous to him, if the conviction is vacated, because then it does not protect
him from prosecution for both of the original charges. See note 22 supra.
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with regard to immunity from prosecution on the greater offense was
exactly the same as Green's status.6 Although the peril faced by Ander-
son, due to the trial judge's consideration of the plea bargain, technically
was insufficient to constitute "jeopardy" under present judicial con-
struction, as Anderson was never formally before the trier of fact on
the greater charge,67 it reasonably can be argued that the peril was func-
tionally equivalent to "jeopardy" and therefore within the scope of
that term for double jeopardy purposes."' Under this expanded definition
of "jeopardy," it follows that Anderson's fundamental right to raise the
defense of prior jeopardy with respect to the greater offense attached
at the moment of conviction on the lesser offense and could not be lost
without a showing of effective waiver. Therefore, Anderson's appeal
could operate to reopen the possibility of prosecution on the greater
charge only if the appeal constituted an effective waiver of that funda-
mental right to raise the objection to being twice placed in jeopardy
for the same offense.
When it is recognized that the distinction between Green and Ander-
son is more a difference of form than of substance, the following lan-
guage from Green applies most compellingly to the facts in Anderson:
[T ]he Government contends that Green "waived" his constitutional
defense of former jeopardy to a second prosecution on the first
degree murder charge by making a successful appeal of his improper
conviction of second degree murder. We cannot accept this para-
66. A status akin to implicit acquittal existed not only because before appeal of the
lesser charge defendant could not have been tried on the greater, but also because, as
"[the overwhelming majority of prosecutors view the strength or weakness of the
state's case as the most important factor in the task of bargaining", Alschuler, The
Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHi. L. REv. 50, 58 (1968) (footnote
omitted), prosecution on the lesser charge necessarily implies that the state has re-
jected prosecution on the greater charge for lack of evidence.
67. "The Court consistently has adhered to the view that jeopardy does not attach,
and the constitutional prohibition can have no application, until a defendant is 'put to
trial before the trier of facts, whether the trier be a jury or a judge'." Serfass v. United
States, 95 S. Ct. 1055, 1062 (1975), quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479
(1971).
68. It should be noted that the Court has "disparaged 'rigid, mechanical' rules in the
interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause," Serfass v. United States, 95 S. Ct. 1055,
1064 (1975), citing Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 467 (1973), and one court has
stated: "[t]he effect of the entire [plea bargaining] transaction, for double jeopardy pur-
poses, is the equivalent of a jury's refusal to convict on the more serious charge." Rivers




doxical contention.... In any normal sense, ["'waiver"] connotes
some kind of voluntary knowing relinquishment. . . .6'
Is it so apparent that the defendant in Anderson knowingly relinquished
what in substance amounted to "jeopardy rights" by appealing his con-
viction? It is submitted that the defendant's appeal did not constitute such
a "voluntary knowing relinquishment." The Supreme Court has pointed
out numerous times that" 'courts indulge every reasonable presumption
against waiver' of fundamental constitutional rights." 70 In the absence
of an explicit agreement by the defendant during the plea-bargaining
process not to appeal, a finding of knowing relinquishment by so ap-
pealing reverses the above rule and incorrectly presumes a waiver.71
Due Process: The Vindictiveness Inquiry
Simply stated, North Carolina v. Pearce72 and Blackledge v. Perry"'
hold that a defendant is deprived of due process of law when a greater
69. 355 U.S. at 191 (emphasis added in part). The Court continued:
When a man has been convicted of second degree murder and given a
long term of imprisonment it is wholly fictional to say that he "chooses" to
forego his constitutional defense of former jeopardy on a charge of murder
in the first degree in order to secure a reversal of an erroneous conviction
of the lesser offense. In short, he has no meaningful choice.
Id. at 191-92. Quoting from Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 135 (1904), the
Court observed that "it cannot be imagined that the law would deny to a prisoner the
correction of a fatal error, unless he should waive other rights so important as to be
saved by an express clause in the Constitution of the United States." Id.
The concept of waiver is regarded uniformly in judicial decisions as signifying a
voluntary relinquishmtent of a knoum legal right. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464
(1938); American Locomotive Co. v. Gyro Process Co., 185 F.2d 316, 318 (6th Cir.
1950). More recently, the Supreme Court has stated that waivers of constitutional
rights must be "knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970)
(footnote omitted). See also Comment, Criminal Waiver: The Requirements of Per-
sonal Participation, Competence and Legitimate State Interest, 54 CALTF. L. REV. 1262
(1966); BLAcr.'s LAw DicrIoNARY 1751 (4th ed. Rev. 1968). For a unique definition of
"waiver", see United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) noted in Note, The Su-
premne Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARV. L. Rnv. 63, 156 (1968) (though defendant's waiver
of right to trial by jury comported with accepted definitions of "waiver," he none-
theless had no "meaningful choice" when confronted with the option of pleading
guilty or facing a jury trial, when the jury was authorized to recommend the death
penalty, which defendant could not receive on his guilty plea).
70. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy,
301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937) and Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412 (1882).
71. As noted previously, however, notes 55-59 supra & accompanying text, this argu-
ment, though compelling, may not be well-received in light of recent Supreme Court
cases defining double jeopardy as "risk of conviction."
72. 395 U.S. 711 (1969). See notes 30-36 supra & accompanying text.
73. 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974). See notes 37-42 supra & accompanying text.
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charge or sentence is imposed upon him solely for appealing a convic-
tion. In United States ex rel. Williams v. McMann,74 the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit examined this rule when, in a complicated fact
situation, it confronted the question of permissible prosecution following
the vacation of a guilty plea. There, the defendant, charged with illegal
sale of narcotics, was allowed to plead guilty to the lesser charge of at-
tempted sale. Shortly after the anticipated sentence was imposed, it was
discovered that the defendant had a prior felony conviction dating back
fifteen years, which necessitated an extended sentence as the defendant
was a second felony offender. Confronted with this result, the defendant
requested and was permitted to withdraw his plea of guilty. Subsequent-
ly convicted by a jury of the original charge, the defendant successfully
attacked the constitutionality of the felony 'conviction dating back fif-
teen years; he then was sentenced as a first felony offender for a term
exceeding his original sentence under the lesser offense.
Surprisingly, the defendant did not attack his retrial on the greater
offense as a violation of double jeopardy. Rather, he proceeded on due
process grounds by arguing that Pearce required vacation of his sentence
since the judge had not given any justification for the sentence im-
posed .7  The court in McMann quickly disposed of this contention by
noting that justification was not required since the defendant had re-
ceived the shortest sentence permitted by statute for a first felony
offender.7 6
Guided by a district court decision, Sefcheck v. Brewer," which had
anticipated Perry in applying the Pearce concepts to prosecutorial ac-
74. 436 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 914 (1971).
75. Id. at 105. Justification in the record is required by Pearce, note 33 supra.
76. "Given this complete and obvious explanation for the longer sentence, we see
no need to demand the type of justification ordered in Pearce." Id.
77. 301 F. Supp. 793 (S. D. Iowa 1969). Sefcheck involved a defendant who pleaded
guilty to the charge of uttering a false check and was sentenced to a term not to
exceed seven years. Upon a showing that his guilty plea was not entered personally and
in the presence of counsel, the judgment and sentence were vacated as void. Following
withdrawal of his plea, the defendant was convicted of the more serious offense of
uttering a false instrument, and received a maximum sentence of ten years. In habeas
corpus proceedings, the second judgment and sentence also were declared void, con-
sistent with the rationale of Pearce. Noting the retaliatory motive that Pearce
sought to deter, the court in Sefcheck stated: "Fear that the [prosecutor] may vindic-
tively increase the charge would act to unconstitutionally deter the exercise of the
right of appeal or collateral attack as effectively as fear of a vindictive increase in
sentence by the court." Id. at 795.
The court in McMann apparently agreed with the Sefcheck court that subsequent
prosecution on a greater charge following appeal would be presumptively vindictive.
See text accompanying notes 74 & 75 supra. McMann distinguished itself, however,
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tions, the court next extended its inquiry to the question of vindictiveness
on the part of the prosecutor. The defendant in McMann had argued
that the prosecutor's re-institution of the higher charge following the
withdrawal of the guilty plea was indicative of a retaliatory motive and
therefore void on due process grounds. Although the defendant did not
support this allegation with evidence, the court did consider whether
re-instituting the original charges was presumptively vindictive. Analo-
gizing to contract law, the court found it neither surprising nor sug-
gestive of vindictiveness that the prosecutor pursued the greater charge
after the defendant had revoked his "part of the bargain" by success-
fully appealing his guilty plea .7  In so holding, the court apparently
viewed the defendant's consideration in the plea bargain agreement as
a promise to plead and remaiz guilty, rather than merely to plead
by noting that (1), the longer, second sentence (in McMann) was obviously justified
on the ground that the second prosecution was for the greater offense originally brought
against the defendant, and (2), prosecution on that greater offense was justified on the
basis of "the faultless conduct of the prosecutor . . . when compared with that con-
demned in Sefcheck v. Brewer . . where . . . the prosecutor filed a new, more serious
information." 436 F.2d at 105-06. In Sef check no plea bargain was obtained; rather, the
defendant simply pleaded guilty to the offense charged. The challenged action of the
prosecutor was the indictment of the defendant following his successful appeal, on a
greater offense not originally charged or contemplated. The court in Sefcheck found
such action presumptively vindictive, and found no evidence in the facts of the case
by which to refute the presumption. The second prosecution and judgment were held,
therefore, to violate the constitutional due process protections. In contrast, the second
prosecutor in McMann pursued a charge earlier abandoned as the result of a negotiated
plea.
78. That the plea bargain has elements analogous to the elements of a simple contract
was recognized by the Supreme Court in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257
(1971), in which a defendant entered into a plea bargain conditioned on the prom-
ise of the prosecutor not to make a sentence recommendation. The Court stated
that this promise "can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, [and] such
promnise must be fulfilled." Id. at 262 (emphasis supplied). The defendant was held to
have "'bargained' and negotiated for a particular plea in order to secure dismissal of
more serious charges [and the] condition that no sentence recommendation would be
made ....." When such recommendation subsequently was made by the prosecutor, he
was held to be in "breach of agreement" and his claim of inadvertance was considered
no excuse. Id. This frequent use by the Court of terms of obvious significance in
contract law indicates that it contemplates the plea bargain either as a contract
in fact, or as a situation so closely analogous that it could be helpfully illuminated by
the application of contract analysis. See also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970)
(duress and coercion, recognized defenses to the formation of a contract, if carried on
by the state, are sufficient to invalidate a guilty plea; id. at 750); United States v. Ham-
merman, No. 75-1090 (4th Cir. 1975) (defendant allowed to withdraw negotiated plea
because prosecutors misrepresented that district court would honor their recommenda-
tion that he not be imprisoned). See I A. CoRBIN-;, CoRxiN o, CoNTrrRAcrs § 6 (1963 and
Supp. 1971).
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guilty.7 9 This rationale subsequently was adopted in Anderson, in which
the court held that the contrary conclusion "gives the defendant more
than the 'benefit of his bargain' and ensures that he will not even be
placed in jeopardy once under certain circumstances." 80
Such an approach solves the definitional problem of the defendant's
consideration in the plea agreement by giving the Government the bene-
fit of the doubt. Surely, application of this presumption would be invalid
79. Support for the result in McMann, that defendant's consideration included the
right to remain guilty, may be found in Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 95 S. Ct. 886 (1975),
in which the Court stated: "Once the defendant chooses to bypass the orderly pro-
cedure for litigating his constitutional claims in order to take the benefits, if any, of a
plea of guilty, the State acquires a legitimate expectation of finality in the conviction
thereby obtained." Id. at 889. In analyzing the plea bargain as a contract, however, it
would seem that such a legitimate expectation only exists with respect to the facts of
the case upon which the defendant's guilt is based. Therefore, it is arguable that an
appeal based on procedural or constitutional grounds demonstrating improper behavior
by the government would estop the government from arguing that defendant, by so
appealing, breached the plea bargain.
By agreeing in a plea bargain to become and remain convicted a defendant essentially
is waiving his right to appeal. Although there is no federal constitutional right of
appeal, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956), McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684,
687-88 (1894), when a state establishes an appeal procedure, it must assure its constitu-
tional application. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 25 (1973); North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724 (1969). See also Lcfkowitz v. Newsome, supra at 890-91
(1975) (constitutional attacks on pretrial proceedings not waived by guilty plea when
state statute specifically preserves this right). Demanding that a defendant waive this
right in order to secure a plea bargain, is not, however, violative of this requirement. It is
established that in entering a plea of guilty, a defendant consents not to exercise
a number of his constitutional rights. See note 3 supra. Because the right of appeal
does not rise to the dignity of a constitutional right, but is purely statutory, no con-
vincing argument can be made on constitutional grounds against its waiver as a pre-
requisite to obtaining a plea bargain.
80. 514 F.2d at 587. In its due process analysis, Anderson, focusing on the contractual
nature of the plea bargain, quickly disposed of defendant's reliance on United States v.
Jamison, 505 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Therein, defendants were indicted for second
degree murder and brought to trial, during the course of which an error was committed
by defendants' counsel, necessitating a mistrial. Following the prosecutor's subsequent
reindictment of the defendants for the graver offense of first degree murder, the court
held that this action was a denial of due process "absent any showing of justification for
the increase in the degree of the crime initially charged... .. " 505 F.2d at 413.
Anderson distinguished this holding by noting that in Jamison, the Government had
unilaterally elected to charge defendants initially with the lesser offense; the decision had
not been jointly arrived at through a plea bargaining process. The Government's change
in position could not be explained but for the mistrial and a resultant retaliation arising
therefrom. By contrast, noted the Anderson court, the Government therein had not
elected the charge that it would pursue if the matter eventually went to trial. More-
over, defendant's change in plea to not guilty was deemed ample justification for
pursuing the greater charge. 514 F.2d at 588.
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if a court has not attempted first to discern the exact understanding of the
parties as to the possibility of appeal.81 Moreover, failure to so find an
understanding on this issue need not lead necessarily to the McMann and
Anderson result. It could be argued that placing the benefit of the doubt
with the defendant 2 would force prosecutors to negotiate the issue
explicitly in order to dispel the presumption, and therefore precipi-
tate a greater number of express agreements on this issue since prosecu-
tors, more than any other class of attorneys, would be aware of with
whom the benefit is placed. It also appears that, consistent with the
emphasis accorded the protection of individual rights with respect to
criminal justice administration, the benefit is properly placed with the
accused.
CONCLUSION
United States v. Anderson comports with the bulk of case law in its
analysis of the dual-inquiry test. As to the first inquiry, the Govern-
ment was found not to have relinquished absolutely its right to prosecute
an offense that initially was abandoned in favor of a plea bargain.
This analysis is consistent with recent case law defining jeopardy as
"risk of conviction," but fails to recognize that immediately prior to
the appeal of a negotiated guilty plea, a risk akin to jeopardy has at-
tached to all greater offenses.83 It therefore is submitted that the An-
derson analysis of the first inquiry, though clearly supported by recent
decisions, is questionable. As to the due process inquiry, Anderson did
not find the Government vindictive in pursuing conviction for the greater
offense once the defendant successfully had appealed his negotiated guilty
plea. Although this approach is not categorically unreasonable, an equally
viable approach would be to place a rebuttable presumption of vindic-
tiveness on such action.
81. Further developing the similarities betveen the plea bargain and the contract, it
is clear that when a specific term has been negotiated, a court, upon knowledge thereof,
should enforce it per se as part of its general duty to effect the expressed intent of
the parties. See generally CORBIN, supra note 78, at §§ 538, 545 & 549. For a suggested
revision of the entire process of the negotiation of a plea bargain, see Note, Restructuring
the Plea Bargain, 82 YALE L.J. 286, 299-312 (1972).
82. At the least, defendant should be allowed to appeal constitutional and procedural
matters without the loss of this benefit. See note 79 supra.
83. See note 68 supra & accompanying text.
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